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STUDENT COMMENT
ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW OF GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS:
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS PROBLEM
I. INTRODUCTION
When the United States Government is a party to a commercial con-
tract, the traditional remedies for breach of contract lose their applicability,
for the common law is insistent that specific legislative consent precede
suit against the sovereign. 1 Recognizing the Government's broad commercial
involvement with private parties and the inherent injustice of sovereign
immunity in many situations, Congress has stipulated conditions upon
which the federal government may be sued in the federal courts. The Tucker
Act,2
 for instance, provides, inter alia, that "the district courts shall have
original jurisdiction, concurrent with the Court of Claims, of: . . (2)
Any . . . claim against the United States, not exceeding $10,000 in amount,
founded . . . upon any express or implied contract with the United States
. .. ."3 The Suits in Admiralty Act, 4 another statutory waiver, provides
that a libel in personam may be brought against the United States in a
federal district court in any case involving a vessel which is owned or
operated by the United States, or cargo owned or possessed by the United
States, "where if such vessel were privately owned or operated, or if such
cargo were privately owned or possessed, or if a private person or property
were involved, a proceeding in admiralty could be maintained . . .
As might be expected, each of these jurisdictional grants is qualified
by a statute of limitations. An action under the Tucker Act must be "com-
menced against the United States .. . within six years after the right of
action first accrues," or it shall otherwise be barred. 6 Section 745 of the
Suits in Admiralty Act states that "suits . . . may be brought only within
two years after the cause of action arises . . . ."7 Because both acts
temporarily suspend sovereign immunity, their statutes of limitations have
been held to be absolute time bars; the running of the statute does not
simply provide an affirmative defense to a cause of action, but extinguishes
the cause of action itself. 8
It must be noted, however, that although these acts contemplate federal
court actions and base their statutes of limitations on federal court jurisdic-
1 See, e.g., Arizona v. California, 298 U.S. 558, 568 (1936) ; Comegys v. Vasse, 26
U.S. (1 Pet.) 193, 216 (1828).
2 Ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505 (1887) (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
3 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (2) (1964).
4 41 Stat. 525 (1920), as amended, 46 U.S.C. §§ 741-52 (1964).
6 41 Stat. 526 (1920), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 742 (1964).
6 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) (1964).
7 41 Stat. 525 (1920), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 745 (1964).
6 See, e.g., United States v. Greathouse, 166 U.S. 601, 602 (1897), construing Finn v.
United States, 123 U.S. 227, 232-33 (1887).
644
STUDENT COMMENT
tion, the fact is that the initial resolution of a government-contract dispute
is rarely made in that forum. Instead, most government contracts provide
for administrative review of fact disputes by incorporating a standard dis-
putes clause similar to the following:
Any dispute concerning a question of fact arising under this
contract which is not disposed of by agreement shall be decided
by the Contracting Officer [whose] ... decision • . . shall be final
and conclusive unless, within 30 days from the date of receipt of
such copy, the Contractor mails or otherwise furnishes to the
Contracting Officer a written appeal addressed to the Secretary. The
decision of the Secretary . . . shall be final and conclusive unless
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction to have been
fraudulent, or capricious, or arbitrary, or so grossly erroneous as
necessarily to imply bad faith, or not supported by substantial
evidence. In connection with any appeal proceeding under this
clause, the Contractor shall be afforded an opportunity to be heard
and to offer evidence in support of its appeal. Pending final decision
of a dispute hereunder, the Contractor shall proceed diligently
with the performance of the contract and in accordance with the
Contracting Officer's decision.°
Statutory law and case law have firmly established the rule that the inclu-
sion of such a disputes clause in a government contract is tantamount to
a mutual agreement to exhaust administrative remedies before invoking
federal court jurisdiction.'° The purpose of this comment is to examine the
effect which this administrative review has on the statutes of limitations
under the Tucker Act and the Suits in Admiralty Act. Three recent decisions
will highlight the nature of the problem.
IL THE CASES
Northern Metal Co. v. United" States" involved an action under the
Suits in Admiralty Act. By the terms of a contract entered into on April 30,
1957, Northern Metal Company agreed to perform terminal stevedoring
and processing operations for the United States Army. The contract was
duly performed and payment was made. Subsequently, the Army claimed
that it had overpaid Northern in the amount of $530.96, and deducted that
sum from the November 24, 1961 invoice of a similar contract before making
payment to Northern on November 30, 1961. After nearly two years of
administrative proceedings pursuant to the contract disputes clause, the
contracting officer and the Army Board of Contract Appeals found for the
Army and disallowed Northern Metal's claim that the $530.96 had been
improperly deducted. On November 27, 1963, two years and three days
after the deduction, but only three months after administrative disallowance,
Northern brought an action in the federal district court under the Suits in
9 32 C.F.R. § 7.103-12(a) (1966). The particular clause quoted is that used by the
Department of Defense.
10 Wunderlich Act, 68 Stat. 81 (1954), 41 U.S.C. §§ 321-22 (1964); United States
v. Joseph A. Ilolpuch Co., 328 U.S. 234, 240 (1946).
11 350 F.2d 833 (3d Cir. 1965).
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Admiralty Act. The district court held that the two-year statute of limita-
tions had begun to run when the second invoice was submitted (November
24, 1961), and had fully run before suit was instituted in the federal
courts. 12
 Accordingly, the claim was time-barred. The Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit agreed with the district court that the statute had begun
to run on November 24, but ruled that it was suspended during the
pendency of administrative review; therefore the action by Northern Metal
was timely, since it was brought within the two-year statutory period."
In Crown Coat Front Co. v. United States, 14 decided ten months after
Northern, the plaintiff-manufacturer had contracted with the Government
to manufacture and deliver mildew-resistant felt canteen covers. Required
samples were submitted to the Government for approval but were rejected
as nonconforming after tests were conducted in October and November of
1956. The parties agreed to a price modification, however, and the "defective"
covers were accepted on December 14, 1956. Crown Coat claimed that it
did not learn until nearly five years later that the Government had ad-
ministered an improper test to determine the conforming quality of the
samples. Accordingly, on October 4, 1961 (within the six-year statute of
limitations), the company demanded a refund of the price adjustment and
an equitable settlement under the "changes" clause of the contract for
allegedly increased costs. Acting pursuant to the contract-disputes clause,
the contracting officer ruled that the tests conducted by the Government were
proper. His denial of relief was affirmed on February 28, 1963 by the
Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals. Having exhausted all required
administrative remedies, Crown Coat brought a breach-of-contract action
against the Government in the federal district court on July 31, 1963 under
the Tucker Act. The district court dismissed the complaint as time-barred
by the statute of limitations. 11 Affirming, the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit held that the cause of action accrued on December 14, 1956,
the date of final delivery of the canteen covers to the Government, and
that the complaint had not been filed in the district court until more than
six years thereafter." The statute of limitations, in its view, was not
suspended during the pendency of administrative proceedings."
The third case, Nager Elec. Co. v. United States," followed an approach
different in part from Northern and Crown Coat. In Nager the plaintiffs
had contracted with the Atomic Energy Commission to construct a facility
in New York State. After preliminary warnings, a representative of the
AEC, acting under the termination-for-default clause of the contract,
12 230 F. Supp. 38 (ED. Pa. 1964).
11 350 F.2d at 839.
14 363 F.2d 407 (2d Cir. 1966).
15 Civil No. 63-2281, S.D.N.Y., Jan. 29, 1965.
1 G 363 F.2d at 410.
17 Id. at 413. The court of appeals relied heavily for its decision on an earlier
Second-Circuit case brought under the Suits in Admiralty Act. States Marine Corp. v.
United States, 283 F.2d 776 (2d Cir. 1960). There, the court held that the two-year
statute of limitations began to run prior to administrative disallowance and was not
suspended during the pendency of administrative review.
15 368 F.2d 847 (Ct. Cl. 1966).
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terminated twenty-six items of work in July and August of 1958. The plaintiff
appealed these terminations along with other controversies under the disputes
clause. In September of 1963, the AEC Hearing Examiner ruled on all
questions except the termination claims, holding the latter to constitute a
claim for breach of contract and thus beyond the agency's jurisdiction. The
plaintiff appealed from the adverse rulings respecting the other issues in
dispute, but did not appeal from the Hearing Examiner's refusal to decide
the termination claims. On April 23, 1964, the AEC Advisory Board of
Contract Appeals upheld the Examiner's position, and on October 16, 1964,
more than six years after the original terminations, Nager Electric brought
suit under the Tucker Act in the Court of Claims, alleging, inter alia, that
the default terminations were improper. The government moved for summary
judgment, arguing that the action was barred by the six-year statute of
limitations. The Court of Claims, however, held that the cause of action did
not accrue until April 23, 1964, the date of final administrative disallowance,
so that the statute of limitations did not commence to run until that time.
Since the federal court suit was instituted within six months after disallow-
ance, the government's motion for summary judgment was dismissed.
Two major issues emerge from these cases: first, when do the statutes
of limitations under the Tucker Act and the Suits in Admiralty Act begin
to run, i.e., upon accrual of the underlying cause of action, or upon ad-
ministrative disallowance; and second, should the statutes be suspended
during the pendency of administrative review?
III. INITIATION OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
It is generally held that statutes of limitations commence to run upon
the accrual of an underlying cause of action." Antecedent, then, to a
resolution of the limitations question is the inquiry as to when the cause of
action itself "accrues." Courts differ on the issue of accrual both as a general
concept and in cases brought under the Tucker Act and the Suits in
Admiralty Act where administrative review is made a condition precedent
to federal court jurisdiction.20 The Court of Claims, which hears large
numbers of contract-disputes claims, has for some years held that the
accrual of a claim against the Government first occurs at that point in time
1° See, e.g., In re William Duncan & Son, 165 F. Supp. 159, 161 (N.D. Cab 1958).
Note that the Tucker Act specifically incorporates the term "accrues" into its statute of
limitations, while the Suits in Admiralty Act uses the synonym "arises," See p. 644 and
notes 6 & 7 supra.
20 As to "accrual" generally, compare Terteling v. United States, 167 Ct. Cl. 331,
338 (1964) (on claim for reimbursement for litigation expenses, held: accrual occurs
when damages sustained), with Lucom v. Atlantic Nat'l Bank, 354 F.2d 51, 54 (5th
Cir. 1965) (in action alleging taking of property without due process, held: accrual
occurs upon invasion of a right even though damages do not materialize until later).
As to "accrual" in the context of the Tucker Act, compare Cosmopolitan Mfg. Co. v.
United States, 156 Ct. Cl. 142, 144, 297 F.2d 546, 547 (1962), cert. denied sub nom.
Arlene Coats v. United States, 371 U.S. 818 (1963) (when appeals board acted), with
Crown Coat Front Co. v. United States, supra note 14, at 410 (prior to appeals board
action) ; and, in the context of the Suits in Admiralty Act, compare Thurston v. United
States, 179 F.2d 514, 516 (9th Cir. 1950) (upon agency disallowance), with McMahon
v. United States, 342 U.S. 25 (1951) (upon date of injury).
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"when all the events have occured which fix the liability of the Government
and entitle the claimant to institute an action." 24 Applying this notion in
Nager (a Tucker Act case), the court stated that the statute of limitations
begins to run when the work contracted for is completed, or goods are
delivered, unless the contract includes a disputes clause or otherwise
provides for mandatory administrative review. In that event, accrual does
not occur until the plaintiff's claim has been administratively disallowed. 22
The Supreme Court has also spoken on this issue in a case which
arguably covers Northern Metal, Crown Coat, and Nager. McMahon v.
United States 23 involved a seaman's action under the Suits in Admiralty Act.
An administrative review of the claim preceded suit in the district court.
The Supreme Court, addressing itself specifically to the issue of whether
the statute of limitations runs from the date of injury or the date of ad-
ministrative disallowance of the claim, concluded that the statute begins to
run upon the occurrence of the former; the cause of action accrued at the
moment the tort was committed.24 This was the rule later applied in Crown
Coat and Northern Metal under fact situations strikingly similar to Nager.
Therefore, unless Nager can effectively be distinguished from McMahon as
to accrual, it appears that the result reached by the Court of Claims on this
issue is erroneous, while that of the circuits is correct.
One possible basis of differentiation is to distinguish between manda-
tory and nonmandatory administrative proceedings as they relate to accrual.
The Court of Claims and the Supreme Court have, in the past, agreed that
where administrative review of a claim against the Government is permissive
rather than mandatory, accrual for limitations purposes occurs at the time
of injury and not administrative disallowance. 25 The inquiry remains
whether the rule stated in McMahon as to time of accrual is to be applied
only in instances of permissive administrative review or whether it includes
mandatory administrative review cases as well. The Court of Claims in
Nager clearly felt that accrual should be delayed in the latter circum-
stances?' A contrary result, however, is apparent from an examination of
21 Oceanic S.S. Co. v. United States, 165 Ct. Cl. 217, 225 (1964).
22 Nager Elec. Co. v. United States, supra note 18, at 853-54.
23 342 U.S. 25 (1951).
24 Id. at 27.
26 Soriano v. United States, 352 U.S. 270, 275 (1957) ; Steel Improvement & Forge
Co. v. United States, 174 Ct. Cl. —, 355 F.2d 627 (1966).
26 Nager Elec. Co. v. United States, supra note 18, at 853-54. Northern Metal, which
reached a different conclusion on the same issue, was distinguished by the Court of
Claims as a breach-of-contract action. Breach-of-contract claims are among those held
to be outside the disputes procedure and not subject to administrative determination.
See United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394 (1966). Neither the
district court nor the circuit court of appeals, however, spoke of breach of contract in
Northern Metal. In fact, the original libel emphasized the commitment of the parties to
an exhaustive administrative review under the disputes article. The appellant's brief
similarly framed the issues in terms of a claim arising under the contract. In Crown
Coat, by contrast, the petitioner argued breach of contract before both the district court
and the circuit court, although the original claim, pursued administratively under the
"Changes" clause, was one for an equitable adjustment of the contract price. A dictum in
the Utah case stated that "when the contract makes provision for equitable adjustment
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the statute which provided the basis of jurisdiction in McMahon: seamen's
injury claims "shall, if administratively disallowed in whole or in part, be
enforced pursuant to the provisions of the Suits in Admiralty Act." 27
(Emphasis added.) Thus, by statute, administrative review was made a con-
dition precedent to suit, with the result that the Supreme Court's holding in
McMahon necessarily established the rule that accrual occurs prior to ad-
ministrative disallowance even where such administrative review is manda-
tory.
A second possible basis of differentiation between the positions taken
by the Supreme Court and the Court of Claims was asserted in the latter's
argument that the Suits in Admiralty Act and the Tucker Act are historically
distinct from one another. 28 However, nowhere in the Nager opinion is the
substantive nature of the supposed distinction explicitly delineated. All the
court does is extract a portion of the McMahon rationale, restate the Su-
preme Court's rule as to time of accrual in cases under the Suits in Admiralty
Act, and then note that not until Crown Coat has any decision similarly
construed the Tucker Act. 28 Without a clear articulation of its position, the
only inference to be drawn from the court's argument stands as a non
sequitur: that the absence of case law applying the rule of McMahon to
Tucker Act" claims necessarily implies an incompatible historical develop-
ment between the two acts. The fact is that no court, aside from the Court
of Claims and the Third Circuit, has ever had occasion to consider the
accrual question under the Tucker Act in the context of mandatory ad-
ministrative review. 3 °
In short, it appears that no viable distinction exists which might take
Nager outside the rule of McMahon. Each case involved a mandatory ad-
ministrative review, and jurisdiction was invoked under two acts whose
relevant historical differences are dubious. The apparent impossibility of
distinction, however, is not necessarily unfortunate. If the statute of limita-
of particular claims, such claims may be regarded as converted from breach of contract
claims to claims for relief under the contract." id. at 404 n.6. Since the changes article
under which Crown Coat Front Company's claim was first pursued does provide for
the equitable adjustment of claims presented under it, it seems that the company was
required to pursue its administrative remedies before invoking federal court jurisdiction.
Both circuit cases, then, properly followed the contract-disputes procedures and cannot
effectively be distinguished from Nager on that basis.
27 Clarification Act, 57 Stat. 45 (1943), 50 U.S.C. § 1291(a) (App. 1964). Although
McMahon is a Suits in Admiralty Act case, the federal court noted jurisdiction of the
personal-injury claim under the Clarification Act. The latter expands the coverage of
the Suits in Admiralty Act to include seamen's claims for injuries, maintenance, and
cure. Once the claim is properly alleged, the substantive provisions of the Suits in
Admiralty Act control.
28 Nager Elec, Co. v. United States, supra note 18, at 863-65.
29 Id. at 863-64.
20 One reason for the court's apparent difficulty in proving an historical distinction
might well rest on the fact that the more likely argument points to an historical
affinity between the two acts on the accrual issue. Neither contains language specifically
applicable to disallowed claims. Both, however, were enacted subsequent to Kihlberg
v. United States, 97 U.S. 398 (1878), in which the Supreme Court first established the
principle of mandatory administrative review of claims arising under government con-
tracts.
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tions did not commence to run until administrative disallowance of a claim,
the purposes of the statute itself could be substantially frustrated. Since
no statutory requirement exists as to when a petitioner must begin to pursue
his administrative rights, a moving party could indefinitely postpone the
running of the statute by delay in instituting administrative review. 31 The
court in Nager attempts to counter this argument by suggesting that the
danger is nonexistent in view of the stipulation in most disputes clauses that
administrative review be commenced within thirty days. 32 To leave so im-
portant a consideration to the bargaining prowess of the parties, however,
is to neutralize the whole concept of limitations.
IV. THE EFFECT OF MANDATORY ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW
A contracting party who has committed himself to exhaust administra-
tive remedies before invoking federal court jurisdiction on a contract-disputes
claim may be precluded from relief if the applicable statute of limitations
has run before administrative disallowance of his claim. The Third Circuit's
solution, as expressed in Northern Metal, is to suspend the running of the
statute during the administrative review.33 There is, however, a general
reluctance on the part of the courts to permit suspension,34 and the Second
Circuit illustrated this reluctance in Crown Coat when it refused to suspend
the statute of limitations while the plaintiff's claim was before the ad-
ministrative agency." The court suggested that this holding need not work
a hardship upon a claimant, since he may institute a protective suit in the
federal courts during the pendency of administrative review, thus preserving
the cause of action in the event that his claim is administratively dis-
allowed."
The Second Circuit's position is unsound both in its refusal to suspend
the running of the statute of limitations during mandatory review, and in
its suggestion that initiation of a protective suit preserves the plaintiff's
claim. Admittedly, statutes granting jurisdiction to sue the Government are
to be strictly construed, but not so strictly as to lose sight of the grant
itself. It makes little sense to interpret a statute with such rigidity as to
effectively prevent, in a large number of cases, the substantial recourse
prescribed by it. 37 Statutes of limitations accomplish two things: they close
the ledger on potential litigation after a certain period of time, and they
:31 See McMahon v. United States, supra note 23, at 27.
32 Nager Elec. Co. v. United States, supra note 18, at 864.
33 Northern Metal Co. v. United States, supra note 11, at 839.
34 See, e.g., Williams v. United States, 228 F.2d 129, 132 (4th Cir. 1955), cert. denied,
351 U.S. 986 (1956) ; Atlantic Carriers, Inc. v. United States, 131 F. Supp. 1, 4 (S.D.N.Y.
1955).
23 Crown Coat Front Co. v. United States, supra note 14, at 413.
26 Ibid.
37 The Supreme Court apparently recognized the dilemma in a Federal Employers'
Liability Act case where it upheld the suspension of a statute which qualified by
limitation a statutory grant to sue the United States. In Burnett v. New York Cent.
R.R., 380 U.S. 424 (1964), a timely suit was brought in a state court having proper
jurisdiction. Because of improper venue, however, the state court dismissed the action.
The Supreme Court held that the FELA statute of limitations was suspended during
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prevent surprise and hardship to a defendant who, after a period of years,
may be unable to collect evidence and witnesses to support his defense."
Suspending the statute of limitations interferes with neither of these ob-
jectives. The statute is suspended only during administrative review. Accord-
ingly, a petitioner must pursue his administrative remedies within the
statutory period or lose his claim. Further, the administrative record serves
to preserve the evidence and thus virtually eliminates the possibility of
surprise or hardship."
Nor may it be said that the moving party can adequately protect him-
self by instituting a protective suit during the pendency of administrative
review of his claim, for courts which allow such suits do so at their discre-
tion, and not as a matter of right." Further, a policy requiring protective
suits would threaten docket congestion, 4 t and might well defeat legitimate
claims in instances where claimants are unaware of the availability of such
suits.42
V. CoN =slaw
The suspension issue will be resolved by the Supreme Court this term
by virtue of its grant of certiorari to review that question as presented in
Crown Coat:" Hopefully, in cases involving mandatory administrative re-
view, the Court will order suspension of the statute of limitations during
the pendency of administrative proceedings. A statute of limitations should
run only during those periods of time when the petitioner has control of
his cause of action. That he has such control from the date of injury to the
date of commencement of administrative review, and from the date of ad-
ministrative disallowance to the date of his invocation of federal court juris-
diction, is clear. It is equally clear that he has no such control during the
time that the matter is before an administrative agency for review.
Although the Supreme Court has not been asked to consider the issue
of when the statute of limitations begins to run relative to contract-disputes
claims brought under the Tucker Act, perhaps its forthcoming decision will
answer that question as well. Should the Court find that its decision in
McMahon does not control, it is submitted that the rule of that case ought
to be extended to claims under the Tucker Act. To do otherwise would
seriously qualify the purpose of limitations statutes.
DAVID M. COHEN
the pendency of the state suit, thus allowing the petitioner to institute an action in the
federal district court although the statute had otherwise run.
38 Id. at 428.
39 Recent Supreme Court decisions have made clear that in cases involving
mandatory disputes procedures all facts relating to the claims are to be found admin-
istratively and not in the federal courts, United States v. Anthony Grace & Sons, 384
U.S. 424 (1966); United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., supra note 26. See
generally Hiestand & Parler, The Disputes Procedure Under Government Contracts:
The Role of the Appeals Boards and the Courts, 8 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 1 (1966).
40 See , e.g., United States v, \Vinegar, 254 F.2d 693, 696 (10th Cir. 1958).
41 See Northern Metal Co. v. United States, supra note 11, at 839.
42 See Crown Coat Front•Co. v. United States, supra note 14, at 416 (Anderson, J.,
dissenting).
43 Crown Coat Front Co. v. United States, 385 U.S. 811 (1966).
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